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In 2009, a Second Circuit panel heard a case that involved atrocities 
committed in the Sudan.  The panel “assume[d], without deciding, that 
corporations . . . may be held liable for violations of customary 
international law,” under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).1  The ATS 
provides, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”2  Under the ATS, victims of 
human rights abuses could sue private tortfeasors in U.S. federal courts, 
regardless of who committed the abuses or where the abuses occurred. 
One year later, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.3 came before 
the same three-judge panel in the Second Circuit on an interlocutory 
                                                                                                                  
 1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 2 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 3 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011). 
2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS 45 
appeal.  A majority of the panel declared that it would not be bound by 
its prior assumption,4 and held that a transnational corporation could not 
be liable for violations of the law of nations because the law of nations 
has customarily imposed liability only upon States and natural persons, 
and it has declined to extend liability to corporate entities.5 
Judge José Cabranes wrote the Kiobel majority opinion, which was 
joined by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs.  The majority reasoned that 
customary international law defines those who are subject to human 
rights norms and establishes who can be liable for violating those norms.  
Since no corporation has ever been liable for human rights torts in an 
international tribunal, these corporate defendants could not have 
committed a “violation.”  Without a violation of the law of nations, the 
ATS could not provide the court with subject matter jurisdiction.  The 
third member of the appellate panel passionately opposed this 
construction of the word “violation.”  Senior Judge Pierre Leval 
nevertheless concurred in the judgment, dismissing the case on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs’ claim was not well-pleaded. 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve two 
questions arising from Kiobel: (1) whether the issue of corporate civil 
tort liability under the ATS is a question of merits or of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and (2) “[w]hether corporations are immune from tort 
liability for violations of the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial 
executions or genocide[.]”6  This article addresses not only these specific 
issues, but also explores the highly relevant canons of statutory 
interpretation, norms of international law, and the facts, evidence, and 
circumstances surrounding the Kiobel decision that will likely remain 
untouched by the Supreme Court.  There is a parable that aptly illustrates 
the situation: 
An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was sitting by a river 
when a Traveler approached and said: 
“I wish to cross.  Will it be lawful to use this boat?” 
“It will,” was the reply; “it is my boat.” 
The Traveler thanked him, and pushing the boat into the water 
embarked and rowed away.  But the boat sank and he was 
drowned. 
                                                                                                                  
 4 See id. at 118–20. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011); Lyle Denniston, 
Court to Rule on Suing Corporations and PLO, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=129758. 
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“Heartless man!” said an Indignant Spectator.   Why did you not 
tell him that your boat had a hole in it?” 
“The matter of the boat’s condition,” said the great jurist, “was 
not brought before me.”7 
This article advances the position of the Kiobel minority one step 
further to argue that the majority’s interpretation of the ATS rests upon 
fundamentally unsound principles of statutory construction.  Neither 
federal law nor international law exempts corporations from observance 
of universally accepted human rights laws.  I argue here that the Kiobel 
majority erred, and the Supreme Court should reverse the Second 
Circuit’s decision. 
Part II of this article explains the importance and novelty of the 
Kiobel decision and examines both the majority and minority opinions in 
detail.  Part III argues that the majority’s reasoning is based upon an 
unsound construction of the ATS.  My interpretation of the statute 
comprises four main arguments. 
First, the statute itself does not limit the breadth of the ATS.  While 
it requires that plaintiffs be aliens—and even a corporate entity can be an 
ATS plaintiff—there is no limitation on defendants.  And plain meaning 
should be decisive.  Furthermore, a fair construction of the statute around 
the time of its original enactment would have been likely to conclude that 
the statute allows suits against corporations. 
Second, the interaction of the ATS with other federal laws indicates 
that a limitation on corporate liability, if one is to be found, must arise 
under federal, not international law.  To limit the breadth of the ATS, 
either Congress must pass subsequent limiting legislation or courts must 
give it a limiting construction.  Congress has limited one class of ATS 
defendants: an ATS lawsuit may not proceed against a foreign sovereign. 
It has not limited such lawsuits against corporations.  
Third, the Supreme Court’s clarification of the statute in 2004 
introduced even more ambiguities, principally the nature of an 
international “norm” and whether the distinction between natural and 
juridical persons is “related” to subject matter jurisdiction.  The Kiobel 
majority felt “required” by the 2004 decision to search international law 
sources to establish a custom of corporate liability as a prerequisite for 
subject matter jurisdiction.  However, the Supreme Court does not, in 
fact, require this inquiry. 
                                                                                                                  
 7 Ambrose Bierce, A Defective Petition, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE 
BIERCE, vol. VI 294 (1911), available at http://books.google.com/ebooks?id=EnpKAAA 
AYAAJ at 280. 
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Fourth—a more creative approach to statutory construction—the 
ATS, though first codified in 1789, was essentially reauthorized by 
Congress in 1991. The Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), passed 
alongside the ATS, should be relevant to any construction of the older 
statute.  In pari materia analysis of the TVPA gives the ATS a new 
meaning and purpose.  The TVPA does not, however, clarify the 
corporate liability issue because however the statute is construed—to 
either allow or exempt corporate defendants—the construction must be 
based to some degree in absurdity. 
Part IV asserts that the Kiobel majority has improperly imported 
norms of personal jurisdiction from international criminal tribunals into 
ATS subject matter jurisdiction requirements.  The majority’s 
interpretation requires in essence an international cause of action.  This 
holding erroneously departs from the established method of creating a 
cause of action using different strands of common law and improperly 
elevates international law above federal law.  The minority’s 
consideration of this issue as one of remedy is closer to the mark, but it 
makes the same mistake of importing a procedural rule without adequate 
support. 
Part V demonstrates that even if the Kiobel majority is correct in 
interpreting the ATS to require an international custom of enforcing 
human rights law against corporations, it ignored evidence that would 
support such a custom.  Contrary to the majority’s holding, international 
law does consider corporate actors to be subject to human rights norms, 
and it has enforced those norms against a corporation.  Additionally, the 
majority’s review of international law sources is incomplete, and the 
rapid development of this area of international law casts further doubt on 
the majority’s conclusion.  Kiobel should be decided in light of the 
environment it affects: an increasingly globalized world in which 
transnational corporations often hold more economic power than many 
States. 
II. IS KIOBEL AN OUTLIER, OR THE END OF CORPORATE LIABILITY? 
Human rights abuses were committed in the Niger Delta from 
1993–1995.  The Kiobel plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch/Shell and its 
corporate subsidiaries aided and abetted the commission of those abuses.  
The plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of New York, alleging that 
Shell provided transportation, food and compensation to ultraviolent 
Nigerian soldiers, and that Shell had a hand in the sham trials and death 
sentences of nine Ogoni protesters, including Dr. Barinem Kiobel and 
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Ken Saro-Wiwa.8  A U.S. federal court could not determine whether 
Shell bore any responsibility for those abuses unless it had jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the cause of action.  This article, therefore, 
discusses the facts of this fascinating case only insofar as they are 
relevant to ATS jurisdiction. 
The Kiobel action, like other ATS cases over the past 15 years, 
sought to litigate notorious injustices.  One business commentator noted 
the proliferation of ATS litigation against companies “doing business in 
conflict-torn regions [and] . . . . countries with poor human rights records 
or oppressive governments . . . .”9  Many of the defendants have been 
involved in “extractive industries . . . such as ExxonMobil in Indonesia, 
Occidental in Colombia, Talisman in Sudan, Shell in Nigeria, Unocal in 
Burma, and Rio Tinto in Papua New Guinea.”10  Other ATS suits have 
alleged that Pfizer conducted medical experiments on Nigerian children 
without consent, and that Nestle used child labor to work cocoa 
plantations in the Ivory Coast.11  Even al-Qaeda, a vague entity with no 
definable corporate headquarters, has been sued under the ATS.12 
In Saleh v. Titan, 250 Iraqis brought suit against American 
contractors CACI International and Titan Industries (now dba L-3 
Services), alleging violations of human rights in Abu Ghraib prison and 
other detention facilities.13  The last of these generated political backlash 
against the ATS in general, but it illustrates a significant goal of ATS 
plaintiffs: to expose human rights violations by trying them in the court 
of public opinion. 
The dismissal of the case against Shell in 2010 by the divided 
Second Circuit panel made headlines, and the sweep of the ruling gained 
                                                                                                                  
 8 Pleadings and other court documents for the Wiwa/Kiobel case are available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/12/065.html.  Several plaintiffs, 
including Wiwa’s son, settled with Shell in 2009.  Jad Mouwad, Shell to Pay $15.5 
Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at B1.  Kiobel’s widow is now 
the lead plaintiff. 
 9 John B. Bellinger, Will Federal Court’s Kiobel Ruling End Second Wave of Alien 
Tort Statute Suits?, 25 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION No. 34, 2 (Nov. 12, 2010), 
available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/11-12-
10Bellinger_LegalBackgrounder.pdf (citations omitted). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 784 n.16, 785 
n.19, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing ATS claims to proceed against al Qaeda and two 
alleged “fronts” for that “organization”). 
 13 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Juli Schwartz, Saleh v. Titan 
Corporation: The Alien Tort Claims Act: More Bark Than Bite? Procedural Limitations 
and the Future of ATCA Litigation Against Corporate Contractors, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 867 
(2006); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 
2009). 
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immediate attention.14  It was the first appellate15 decision to hold that 
the ATS could not be used against corporations.16  The position taken by 
the majority appeared to gain steady ground in lower courts since the 
decision was issued in September 2010.17  An Indiana district court, for 
example, dismissed an ATS claim against a corporation, solely on the 
persuasiveness of Kiobel.18  One week later, the same court disposed of a 
similar case, this time on the merits rather than for want of jurisdiction.19  
Within the Second Circuit, one post-Kiobel dismissal did not even 
generate a written opinion.20  Elsewhere, plaintiffs’ attorneys attempted 
to control the fallout.21 
Meanwhile, attorneys for Esther Kiobel petitioned the panel for a 
rehearing en banc, which was denied; the remaining active judges of the 
Second Circuit voted 5–5 to rehear Kiobel, which had the effect of 
denying a rehearing.22 
Several months later, the Eleventh Circuit allowed an ATS suit 
against a corporate defendant to proceed, creating a circuit split.23  
Shortly after the Kiobel plaintiffs filed their Petition for Certiorari,24 the 
Seventh Circuit also split with the Kiobel majority on the question of 
                                                                                                                  
 14 Bob Van Voris and Patricia Hurtado, Nigeria Torture Case Decision Exempts 
Companies From U.S. Alien Tort Law (Sep. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-17/u-s-corporations-aren-t-subject-to-alien-
tort-law-appeals-court-rules.html. 
 15 A district court in California reached this same conclusion one week before the 
Kiobel decision was filed.  See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1132–45 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (the practice of forced child labor in cocoa fields in Mali was not actionable 
because of defendant’s corporate nature). 
 16 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 151 note * (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Leval, J, concurring). 
 17 E.g., Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09-495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 
2010); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Flomo v. 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
 18 Viera, 2010 WL 3893791 at *2. 
 19 Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817. 
 20 Mastafa, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 298–301 (noting that ATS claims were dismissed in 
open court). 
 21 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. 
Drummond Co., Inc., No. 7:09-cv-1041, 2010 WL 4036147, at *41–*42 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 
12, 2010) (arguing Kiobel should not be persuasive authority). 
 22 Kiobel, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011); reh’g, en banc, denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 23 Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 631 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2011); Romero v. 
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Julian G. Ku, The 
Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of 
Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 367–68 (2011) (reporting the Eleventh 
Circuit’s lack of analysis on the issue). 
 24 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 
132 S.Ct. 472 (2011). 
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corporate liability.25  A divided D.C. Circuit has since departed from 
Kiobel as well, although it denied that corporations may be liable under 
the TVPA.26  In October, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
hear Kiobel alongside Mohamad v. Rajoub.27 
The majority’s ruling in Kiobel raised numerous policy questions 
that extend beyond the narrow issues to be addressed by the Supreme 
Court.  If federal courts do not have jurisdiction over alien tort claims 
against corporations, what becomes of the actions against corporate 
entities that were fully litigated before this ruling?  In one trial, a jury 
found a corporation liable for violations of international law and awarded 
compensatory and punitive damages.28  In another case, an $80 million 
default judgment was entered against a corporate defendant for forced 
labor violations.29  Other ATS litigation has resulted in outcomes 
favorable to defendants, one notable example being a jury’s unanimous 
verdict that Chevron was not responsible for violence against protesters 
who had taken over an oil platform.30  If the court had no power to hear 
the case, any verdict would be invalid—would res judicata prevent the 
plaintiffs from suing Chevron elsewhere?  If Kiobel is affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, could the damage awards be retroactively dissolved 
because the courts actually had no power to hear the cases?31  The 
Second Circuit does not address these questions. 
The remainder of Part I explains the fundamental disagreement 
between the majority and concurring opinions.  Both assert the need to 
assess possible violations of the law of nations by consulting 
international law.  To determine whether a plaintiff has pleaded a 
“violation of the law of nations,” Judge Leval’s concurring opinion 
would ask whether an international criminal tribunal could punish the 
                                                                                                                  
 25 Flomo v. Firestone, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 26 See part III.C, infra; Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 27 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011); Lyle Denniston, 
Court to Rule on Suing Corporations and PLO, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=129758. 
 28 Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008).  The verdict the following year awarded $1.75 million to plaintiffs.  See More Law 
Lexapedia, www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=1:08-cv-01659-BMC&s=NY&d= 
40919 (case summary noting verdicts). 
 29 Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ($80 million 
verdict for plaintiffs who endured forced labor). 
 30 Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Romero v. 
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (verdict absolved defendants of 
responsibility for deaths). 
 31 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4–6) (allowing relief from a judgment that is void, or that 
was based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed and vacated, but only if the 
motion is filed “within a reasonable time” 60(c)). 
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conduct alleged here.”32  The majority, by contrast, asks whether an 
international criminal tribunal could punish this defendant for the 
conduct alleged here.33 
A disconnect within the judicial panel is apparent.  Judge Leval 
described the majority’s logic as “internally inconsistent.”34  Though 
Judge Leval’s conclusion seems correct, he fails to understand how the 
majority reached its conclusions.  This section endeavors to understand 
the majority’s reasoning by probing the unexpressed assumptions that 
underlie its logic.  Because Judge Leval’s worldview is apparent 
throughout, there is no similar need to plumb subtext in the concurring 
opinion. 
A.  The Kiobel Majority 
1. Substance of the Opinion 
Judge Cabranes begins by observing that while the ATS places a 
limitation on plaintiffs, it is silent regarding defendants.35  Because the 
statute does not indicate who can violate the law of nations, the first issue 
facing the majority is which law should fill that gap, international or 
federal law?36 
The majority’s ATS analysis here follows the guidelines laid out in 
the landmark Supreme Court decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.37  In 
2004, the Supreme Court heard an ATS claim that was brought against a 
natural person acting under the authority of the United States.38  Justice 
Souter mentioned the issue of corporate liability in a footnote, to which 
the Kiobel majority turned for direction: “In Sosa the Supreme Court 
instructed the lower federal courts to consider ‘whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual.’”39  If international law does not provide 
liability against a given actor, it cannot be alleged that the actor has 
committed the tort in violation of the law of nations, so the plaintiffs 
have failed to establish an element necessary for jurisdiction.  In Kiobel, 
                                                                                                                  
 32 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149–51 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Leval, J., concurring). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152, 153, 174 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 35 Id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 36 Id. at 122, 125. 
 37 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 126 (quoting and adding emphasis to Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)). 
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the plaintiffs alleged that Shell had aided and abetted human rights 
abuses.40  Applying Souter’s instruction, the majority asked whether 
international law had identified non-State entities that may be held 
responsible for committing that act.41  The court concluded that aiding 
and abetting is indeed within the scope of liability in international law.42 
To determine whether to address corporate liability before conduct, 
the majority drew support from Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in 
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd,43 a Second Circuit decision 
that followed Sosa and established civil liability for aiding and abetting 
the violation of an international law norm.44  “[T]o assure itself that it has 
jurisdiction to hear a claim under the [ATS],” Katzmann wrote, “[a 
court] should first determine whether the alleged tort was in fact 
‘committed in violation of the law of nations,’ . . . and whether this law 
would recognize the defendants’ responsibility for that violation.”45  
Katzmann noted that although domestic law carried a presumption 
against aiding and abetting liability, international law did extend liability 
to non-State actors who aided and abetted violations of the law of 
nations.46  Liability on the theory of aiding and abetting was generally 
recognized by international law, so a jurisdictional claim could be upheld 
on that basis.47 
The majority reasoned that corporate liability is like aiding and 
abetting liability in that it is not itself a violation, but rather a norm that 
seeks to identify those responsible for the underlying offense.48  “It is 
inconceivable that a defendant who is not liable under customary 
international law could be liable under the ATS.”49  Thus, international 
law must assign liability to an aiding and abetting corporation before the 
ATS will do so. 
The majority points out that this principle has long been the law in 
other ATS cases as well.50  For example, the Nuremberg tribunals 
established individual criminal liability for individuals acting under color 
of State law.  Under this rule, Palestinian attackers could not be held 
liable for bombing a busload of Israelis in a 1984 ATS case, in part 
                                                                                                                  
 40 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117. 
 41 Id. at 125. 
 42 See id. at 129–30. 
 43 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 44 Kiobel, 621 F.3d. at 129. 
 45 Id. (quoting Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270) (alteration in original). 
 46 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129–30 (citing Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 129–30. 
 49 Id. at 122 (emphasis added). 
 50 Id. at 128. 
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because the Palestinian Liberation Organization was not a recognized 
State, and in part because liability for “individuals acting separate from 
any State’s authority or direction” was “less established.”51  That is to 
say, the nature of the defendant served to bar the suit.  Ten years later, 
however, the Second Circuit acknowledged that customary international 
law had evolved when it found that Radovan Karadžić could be held 
liable for crimes against humanity committed while he was president of 
Srpska, another quasi-State.52  The court stated, “[w]e have looked to 
international law to determine whether State officials, private 
individuals, and aiders and abettors, can be held liable under the ATS.  
There is no principled basis for treating the question of corporate liability 
differently.”53 
Next, the Kiobel majority turned to traditional sources of customary 
international law to determine whether States had established a 
consistent practice of holding corporations liable for human rights 
violations and whether a sense of legal obligation impelled them to do 
so.54  The majority notes that international law identifies who may be 
held responsible for violating its norms.  Since the Nuremberg tribunals, 
“international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well 
as upon states.”55  Although liability is well established for living, 
breathing aiders and abettors, it is not established for corporations.  In 
fact, the London charter that established the tribunals provided 
jurisdiction exclusively over natural persons.56  While the International 
Military Tribunal did have the authority to indict criminal organizations, 
a declaration that a defendant was part of a criminal organization “did 
not result in the organization being punished or having liability assessed 
against it.  Rather, the effect of declaring an organization criminal was 
merely to facilitate the prosecution of individuals who were members of 
the organization.”57 
The majority noted in particular that several executives of I.G. 
Farben, a corporation that was thoroughly complicit in Nazi atrocities, 
were tried for war crimes.58  However, the military tribunals at 
                                                                                                                  
 51 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied 470 U.S. 103 (1985); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128. 
 52 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 53 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130 (internal citations omitted). 
 54 Id. at 132 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(2) and ICJ Statute, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 art. 38 (1945)). 
 55 The Nuremberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 119 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 
at Nuremberg, 1946), quoted in Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127. 
 56 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133–34. 
 57 Id. at 134. 
 58 Id. 
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Nuremberg did not indict Farben itself.59  Why not prosecute the entity 
responsible for Auschwitz?  The majority seizes on the trial’s most 
memorable passage: “Crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities [i.e. States], and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”60  Thus, in 1948, individual liability was a recognized 
norm of international law, and corporate liability was not. 
The Kiobel court then asked whether international law has evolved 
since then to enforce norms of corporate responsibility.  The majority 
answered in the negative, holding that subsequent international criminal 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda reached the same conclusion as the 
tribunal at Nuremberg.61  So too has the International Criminal Court, 
established by the Rome Statute in 1998.62  Additionally, the majority 
notes that international tribunals do not have jurisdiction to impose civil 
liability on any private actor.63 
In addition to international tribunals, the majority also considered 
other sources of international law: treaties and the writings of 
publicists.64  While some treaties, such as the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, provide for corporate liability, the majority found that they 
are limited to their specific subject areas.  The Kiobel majority concluded 
that no treaty explicitly provides private causes of action for international 
human rights violations that extend liability to corporations.65 
Although scholars and jurists have addressed the idea of corporate 
criminal liability66 and international corporate obligations,67 they fail to 
provide evidence that liability for corporations is customarily enforced 
by international law today.  “Tellingly, most proponents of corporate 
liability under customary international law discuss the subject as merely 
a possibility or a goal, rather than an established norm of customary 
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 64 Id. at 137–45. 
 65 Id. at 141. 
 66 E.g., José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1(2011); Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under 
International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on 
an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000). 
 67 E.g., David D. Christensen, Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights 
Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 
1219, 1235 (2005). 
2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS 55 
international law,” the majority asserts.68  The majority opinion includes 
citations to notable proponents of human rights enforcement, including 
Menno Kamminga, Steven Ratner, Beth Stevens, and Paul Hoffman (the 
last of whom was the lead advocate for the Kiobel plaintiffs.69  Hoffman 
also represented Humberto Álvarez-Machaín in 2004, and he argued the 
appeals at the Seventh and D.C. Circuits in 2011).70  These scholars were 
consulted to provide “trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”71  
Their writings, far from adducing evidence to show the actual practice of 
corporate liability at the international level, in fact indicate that such 
liability is aspirational in nature.72 
Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority in Kiobel, indicates that 
the absence of an international legal norm extending the scope of liability 
to corporations must be dispositive.73  At present, corporate entities 
(“juridical persons”) cannot be regarded as subjects of international law 
with duties to abide by human rights norms.  “To permit [federal] courts 
to recognize corporate liability under the ATS, however, would require, 
at the very least, a different statute—one that goes beyond providing 
jurisdiction over torts committed ‘in violation of the law of nations’ to 
authorize suits against entities that are not subjects of customary 
international law.”74 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the ATS should not be read “to 
encourage United States courts to create new norms of customary 
international law unilaterally.”75  If a domestic court recognized such a 
norm, and it was not universally accepted, the court might “create 
friction in our relations with foreign nations and, therefore, would 
contravene the international comity the statute was enacted to 
promote.”76 
For these reasons, the majority held that plaintiffs had not charged a 
violation of international law, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. 
2. The Majority’s Underlying Worldview 
The majority decision has a long reach: Kiobel does not merely 
stand for the principle that corporations cannot be sued on a tort theory 
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of aiding and abetting.  Rather, it finds that corporate entities cannot 
violate customary international law, because they are not subject to it. 
The majority’s discourse on subjects of international law indicates a 
narrower definition of the word “violation.”  A violation is not merely 
breaking a rule.  Rather, a person or entity is only subject to a rule if he, 
she, or it can reasonably expect sanctions for noncompliance.77  This idea 
is not well-developed by the majority, but it is rooted in common sense.  
“If you want to know the law and nothing else,” Justice Holmes once 
said, “you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a 
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct . . . in the vaguer sanctions 
of conscience.”78  Holmes explained that the notion of a legal duty is 
rooted in the prophecies of what courts will do in fact, not what they 
ought to do.79  With custom as its only guidepost, it seems intuitive for 
the Kiobel majority to tacitly assume that an unenforced rule is a nullity.  
Since corporations have no expectation of being held liable for human 
rights violations under international law, it would be unfair to grant a 
court power to impose liability upon them.80 
The pair of international law principles identified by the majority—
no criminal liability for corporations, and no civil liability for any private 
actor—indicates that corporations have no obligations under 
international law.  They therefore are not subject to that law. 
The majority opinion is also an exercise in legal formalism in that it 
avoids—and even admonishes—policy considerations that might favor 
the plaintiffs.  For the majority, strict adherence to established principles 
of customary international law is an end in itself.  There is no discussion 
of the evils addressed by the modern line of Alien Tort Statute 
jurisprudence.  The discussion of whether ATS litigation enmeshes the 
judiciary in foreign relations, which may have been the purpose of Sosa’s 
footnote 20, is mentioned only in passing.81  Judge Leval disagreed, 
stating, “‘[l]imiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the 
corporation . . . makes little sense in today’s world,’ and ‘[d]efendants 
present[ed] no policy reason why corporations should be uniquely 
                                                                                                                  
 77 See Alvarez, supra note 66, at 22–24. 
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exempt from tort liability under the ATS[.]’”82  The majority rejoined, 
“[c]ustomary international law . . . is developed through the customs and 
practices of States, not by what ‘makes . . . sense’ to a judge, [or] the 
‘policy reason[s]’ recognized by a judge.”83 
Judge Cabranes, an international law expert, appears to reject the 
notion that his decisions on the law of nations make him a participant in 
the gradual formation of custom.  Instead, his majority opinion takes the 
position that international law norms are merely discoverable.  The 
majority indicates that its Kiobel decision could be reversed if Congress 
specifically authorized subject matter jurisdiction for international law 
claims against corporate defendants, or if corporate liability ripened into 
a specific, universal, obligatory norm of international law.84 
B.  The Kiobel Minority 
While Judge Cabranes treats customary international law as a body 
of norms whose practice can be discovered, Judge Leval’s minority 
opinion appears to view federal courts as contributors in the gradual 
creation and development of international custom and principles.  
Because of this worldview, the minority perceives not that the majority 
has discovered the absence of a rule of corporate liability, but rather that 
the majority has fabricated a positive rule of corporate immunity.85 
The majority’s logic, in Judge Leval’s eyes, amounts to a crime 
against humanity, and he attacks with quotable panache.  “According to 
the rule my colleagues have created, one who earns profits by 
commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can 
successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims for compensation 
simply by taking the precaution of conducting the heinous operation in 
the corporate form.”86  For example, “[m]y colleagues’ new rule offers 
secure protection for the profits of piracy so long as the perpetrators take 
the precaution to incorporate the business.”87  Nearly two-thirds of Judge 
Leval’s opinion is devoted to criticizing the majority’s reasoning and 
conclusions. 
Judge Leval nevertheless accedes to both of the majority’s most 
important propositions.  He agrees that “the place to look for answers 
                                                                                                                  
 82 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 140 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. 
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whether any set of facts constitutes a violation of international law is to 
international law,” and also that “the rules of international law do not 
provide civil liability against any private actor and do not provide any 
form of liability [against] corporations.”88  And while the concurrence 
does not explicitly challenge the assertion that international law should 
provide the scope of liability for ATS cases, the approach is more 
nuanced.  The concurrence agrees with an interpretation of the ATS by 
German attorney and scholar Michael Koebele that “the ATS, although 
incorporating international law, is still governed by and forms part of 
torts law which applies equally to natural and legal persons unless the 
text of a statute provides otherwise.”89  The law of nations in the areas of 
human rights and the law of war generally regulates conduct, but it is 
generally silent on how such norms may be enforced (universal criminal 
jurisdiction is a notable exception).  “[International law] leaves the 
manner of enforcement, including the question of whether there should 
be private civil remedies for violations of law, almost entirely to 
individual nations.”90 
This theme reverberates through the concurring opinion to 
challenge the majority’s next contention: that international criminal law 
must extend liability to corporations before the ATS will do so.91  The 
minority accepts that international law does not recognize corporate 
criminal liability.92  But there is a good reason for this limitation: 
criminal liability is generally not appropriate for a corporation.  “The 
reasons why the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals has been 
limited to the prosecution of natural persons, as opposed to juridical 
entities, relate to the nature and purposes of criminal punishment, and 
have no application to the very different nature and purposes of civil 
compensatory liability.”93 
Criminal sanctions serve several purposes, the concurrence points 
out.94  Society may justly demand retribution to make an offender suffer 
for the suffering he caused; incapacitate the offender by incarcerating 
him; correct the offender using fear of punishment to dissuade him from 
future bad acts; and deter others who may wish to avoid similar 
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punishments.95  However, none of these objectives is reached by 
imposing criminal punishments on a corporate entity.96  “A corporation, 
having no body, no soul, and no conscience, is incapable of suffering, of 
remorse, or of pragmatic reassessment of its future behavior.”97 
Corporate criminal liability would be bad policy because it would not 
achieve those stated goals. 
Furthermore, international organizations rightly refuse to extend 
criminal liability to corporations for practical reasons.  Mens rea cannot 
reasonably be imputed.  A corporation cannot be incapacitated by 
imprisonment.  “[W]hen the time comes to impose punishment for past 
misdeeds, the corporation’s owners, directors, and employees may be 
completely different persons from those who held the positions at the 
time of misconduct [which could] undermine the objectives of criminal 
law by misdirecting prosecution away from those deserving of 
punishment.”98  The Seventh Circuit later pointed out that “if a crime . . . 
is committed or condoned at the managerial or board of directors level of 
the corporation, the corporation itself is criminally liable.”99 
The minority agreed with the majority’s reasoning that international 
crimes are committed by people, not abstract entities, and therefore an 
evaluation of the conduct of those entities is not foreclosed.100  “Among 
the focuses of the Nuremberg trials was the exploitation of slave labor by 
I.G. [Farben] . . . .  The tribunal found that Farben’s program of 
exploitation of slave labor violated the standards of international law.”101  
By emphasizing this nuance, the minority rejects the notion that no 
violation has occurred unless criminal liability could result.  The action 
of exploiting slaves constituted a violation of international law at the 
moment it occurred, regardless of who committed the act, or what 
liability might attach, or whether an international or national court could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the violator.102  Under the majority’s 
formulation, in contrast, “compensatory damages may be awarded under 
the ATS against the corporation’s employees, natural persons who acted 
in the corporation’s behalf, but not against the corporation that 
commanded the atrocities and earned profits by committing them.”103 
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Civil liability, in contrast with criminal liability, serves different 
ends, the concurrence explains.  “A principal objective of civil tort 
liability is to compensate victims of illegal conduct for the harms 
inflicted on them and to restore to them what is rightfully theirs.”104  
These objectives cannot be reached by suing the responsible employees 
of a corporation.  “Because the corporation, and not its personnel, earned 
the principal profit from the violation of the rights of others, the goal of 
compensation of the victims likely cannot be achieved if they have 
remedies only against the [natural] persons who acted on the 
corporation’s behalf, even in the unlikely event that the victims could sue 
those persons in a court which grants civil remedies for violations of 
international law.”105  Thus, the majority erred by looking primarily to 
international criminal law and only briefly to international civil law. 
The minority asked instead, how does the law of nations 
customarily impose civil liability for violations of its norms?106  Far from 
being silent on the issue, international law frequently delegates 
responsibility for civil enforcement of its norms.  The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for example, is 
“typical” in that it “defines the illegal act of genocide, obligates State 
parties to enforce its prohibition, and leaves it to each State to devise its 
own system for giving effect to the Convention’s norms.”107 
The U.S. is one of those parties, and it has affected such a system.  
The courts of the United States have been open to the law of nations 
since their founding.  The “define and punish” clause of the Constitution 
allows U.S. courts to adjudicate crimes committed in violation of the law 
of nations, no matter where committed.108  The Alien Tort Statute in a 
similar fashion allows universal civil jurisdiction by authorizing U.S. 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over torts committed in violation of 
international law.109  In both types of cases, jurisdiction rests on the 
character of the act, not the personality of the actor. 
The concurring opinion also explains why ATS subject matter 
jurisdiction in federal courts should not be coextensive with personal 
jurisdiction in international criminal tribunals: the tribunals “withhold 
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criminal liability from juridical entities for reasons that have nothing to 
do with whether they violated the conduct norms of international law, but 
result only from a perceived inappropriateness of imposing criminal 
judgments on artificial entities.”110 
Judge Leval makes two points regarding how international civil law 
may inform “scope of liability” principles.  First, international law 
recognizes and assigns civil liability to abstract entities.111  Statehood, 
like incorporation, creates an abstract entity with legal personage, and the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) (among others) may award 
reparations from one State to another.  It is therefore no great leap to 
assume that international law supports a theory of liability that 
encompasses juridical persons, such as corporations.112  Secondly, human 
rights conventions assign the task of enforcing their norms of conduct 
against private violators to States, leaving the procedure and rules of 
decision to the domestic legal systems.113  Every legal system in the 
world extends liability to corporations for torts.  The ATS does too.  This 
pair of principles—international law’s recognition of civil damages 
borne by bloodless entities (States), and punishment of private entities by 
domestic courts for violations of human rights law—indicates that there 
is nothing wrong with entertaining suits that allege corporate liability for 
torts committed in violation of the law of nations.  There is certainly 
nothing to suggest that corporations are not subject to human rights 
norms or that they are exempt from observing norms of conduct that 
otherwise command universal acceptance. 
The Kiobel minority, like the majority, discussed Judge Katzmann’s 
exegesis on ATS causes of action.114  To summarize, federal courts 
transmute international criminal acts into federal civil wrongs because 
the ATS provides justice to human rights victims in a different way than 
international criminal law does.115  International criminal tribunals 
establish whether there was wrongdoing and proceed to justice by 
punishing the (private) wrongdoer.116  The federal courts, by contrast, 
establish whether there was wrongdoing using the same international 
criteria, but proceed to justice by compensating the victim.117  The 
majority understood Katzmann to require that the “law [of nations] 
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would recognize the defendants’ responsibility for that violation,”118 but 
the minority fleshes out the principle in greater depth. 
Legal classification can be important to whether or not there has 
been a “violation,” but only when the distinction is between State and 
non-State actors.  Katzmann went on to say, “[w]e have repeatedly 
treated the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the 
AT[S] as indistinguishable from the question of whether private 
individuals may be.”119 
When the majority could not find any “norm” of corporate liability 
within the law of nations, it made what the minority considered an 
enormous and unjustified leap in declaring that corporations are not 
subject to the law of nations, and they owe no duty to abide by 
(otherwise universal) human rights norms.120  In a string of hypotheticals, 
the minority illustrates that the majority’s holding would allow a 
corporation to commit heinous atrocities and shield the corporation’s ill-
gotten profits from any legal accountability.121 
Despite the spirited disagreement on the question of whether the 
ATS allows for corporate liability, Judge Leval nonetheless concurs in 
the judgment to dismiss the case for failure to state a proper claim for 
secondary liability.122  The Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan found that international law’s standard for aiding and abetting 
human rights abuses requires a mens rea showing of purpose to bring 
about those abuses.123  Mere knowledge of abuses, even when combined 
with material support in fact is not sufficient “to support the inference of 
a purpose on the defendant’s part to facilitate human rights abuses.”124 
Judge Leval explains by analogy that this standard is appropriate: “The 
shoemaker who makes Hitler’s shoes should not be held responsible for 
Hitler’s atrocities, even if the shoemaker knows that a pair of shoes will 
help Hitler accomplish his horrendous agenda.”125  This complaint did 
                                                                                                                  
 118 Id. at 129–30 n.32. 
 119 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282 (Katzmann, J.), quoted in Kiobel, 621 F.3d at187; see 
also Kiobel, reh’g, en banc, denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2010) (Katzmann, J., 
dissenting) (endorsing the minority’s view of his Khulumani decision). 
 120 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 153 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 196 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 123 Id. at 192 (Leval, J., concurring) (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc. 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009)).  Accord Aziz v. Alcolac Inc., 658 F.3d 
388, 395–98 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 124 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 193 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 125 Id. at 158.  Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (determining due 
process requirements for Bin Laden’s driver, who was charged with conspiracy). 
2011] CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TORTS 63 
not allege specific facts that indicate Shell acted with the requisite 
purpose.126 
It may be relevant for future ATS cases and scholarship to note that 
there appears to be a circuit split on the mens rea requirement for aiding 
and abetting, and that this split appears to reflect a division among 
sources of international law.127  The Ninth Circuit has a more permissive 
standard than the one articulated by the Second Circuit minority.  The 
Ninth Circuit would hear an aiding and abetting claim if the defendant 
gave “knowing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support, 
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”128  
III. A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH: THE ATS DOES NOT 
FORECLOSE CORPORATE LIABILITY 
Contrary to the majority opinion in Kiobel, the ATS does not 
“require [the court to] look to international law to determine [its] 
jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular class of defendant, such 
as corporations.”129  This section analyzes the ATS, and addresses the 
issue of corporate liability within the ATS interpretation. 
The first step of statutory construction analysis is uncontroversial: 
the plain language of the statute does not exclude any defendant.  
Secondly, the legislative history indicates no Congressional intent to 
exclude corporate defendants, and the words would not have been 
understood to exclude such defendants at the time of its enactment.  
Thirdly, another federal statute does enumerate exclusions for foreign 
sovereigns from ATS claims.  These well-settled exclusions should 
inform the more nebulous status of corporate defendants.  Fourth, greater 
credit should be given to Judge Leval’s assertion that the majority 
misread Sosa.  Finally, the ATS should be interpreted in pari materia 
with its clarifying statute, the Torture Victims Protection Act. 
A.  The Plain Meaning Does Not Limit the Breadth of ATS Jurisdiction 
This section examines the plain meaning of the ATS piece by piece.  
Any exercise in statutory construction must begin with the text: “The 
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district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”130  The sentence comprises a broadly worded 
enacting clause restricted by provisos.  The enacting clause of the ATS 
provides federal jurisdiction over any civil action.  A civil action must 
contain three interrelated ingredients: a plaintiff, a defendant, and a 
claim. 
The first proviso of the ATS requires the plaintiff of the action to be 
“an alien.”  In ordinary usage, the word “alien” describes “a person who 
was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States, who is subject to 
some foreign government, and who has not been naturalized under U.S. 
law.”131  Corporate entities are not born, nor can they be naturalized, so 
the ordinary meaning would indicate only natural persons are aliens.  
However, because U.S. courts appear to treat “alien corporations” similar 
to natural alien persons in many respects, 132  the inquiry should not end 
here. 
If a corporation can be an ATS plaintiff, courts should not prevent 
them from appearing as defendants as well.  The Kiobel majority 
summarily dismissed an argument by Harold Koh pointing out that 
international law has, over time, distributed more rights to corporate 
entities, and those rights, by a “parity of reasoning,” ought to entail 
corresponding obligations.133  Koh explained that since transnational 
corporations may bring suits under international law (to ICSID 
arbitration, for example), they must be subjects of that law, and 
therefore, according to Koh, they ought to be correspondingly amenable 
to suit under that law.134 Similarly, if a corporation can sue under the 
ATS, it ought to be amenable to suit under that law as well. 
At least one foreign corporation has filed an ATS claim as a 
plaintiff.135  The corporation had sued Argentina, so sovereign immunity 
blocked the claim because the defendant was not appropriate.136  
Nevertheless the case went all the way to the Supreme Court, and the 
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viability of the corporate plaintiff was not questioned once.137  Since the 
Supreme Court tacitly allowed corporations to be ATS plaintiffs, by an 
analogous parity of reasoning, the ATS should not disqualify suits that 
name corporate defendants.138  Chief Justice Rehnquist said as much, 
writing for the unanimous Court, “[t]he Alien Tort Statute by its terms 
does not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of course has the 
same effect after the passage of the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] 
as before with respect to defendants other than foreign states.”139   
The next proviso places two unrelated limitations on ATS causes of 
action.  The plaintiff’s civil action must be a claim for a tort only.  The 
tort requirement may be satisfied by virtually any injury alleged by the 
plaintiff.140  This, like the alien requirement, seems straightforward.  
Lastly, the tort must have been committed in violation of the law of 
nations.  This final requirement incorporates standards that relate not 
only to the substance of the injury, a legal question, but also to the 
factual circumstances surrounding its commission. 
Importantly, of the three necessary components of civil actions—
plaintiff, defendant, and claim—the Alien Tort Statute addresses only 
two.  It categorically restricts all but a limited specific group of plaintiffs 
and all but a limited subset of claims.  The phrasing does not address the 
nature of any prospective defendant.  The Kiobel concurrence takes the 
statute at face value.  Plaintiffs are limited.  Claims are limited.  Since no 
limitation is placed on defendants, none is intended.  
The majority, by contrast, saw an incomplete statute: the ATS 
strictly limits the viability of plaintiffs and claims, but there is a gap 
regarding viable defendants.  Filling that gap presents a choice-of-law 
issue.  Resolving this issue is difficult, in part because of the 
expansiveness of the phrase “any civil action,”141 and in part because 
“Congress has incorporated by reference” offenses defined by the law of 
nations, rather than “crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail 
every offense” that could arise.142  There is, therefore, a fundamental 
ambiguity in this statute.  To resolve the statutory ambiguity, we turn to 
other pronouncements of the legislature to interpret the language in a 
manner consistent with its objectives. 
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 138 Contra Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142 n.44. 
 139 Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 438. 
 140 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 141 William Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed 
in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 498 (1986) (cited with 
approval by both Souter and Scalia in Sosa, 542 U.S. 692). 
 142 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30, n.6 (1942) (construing a “violation of the law of 
war” by comparison with other “law of nations” provisions). 
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B. Congress Did Not Intend to Limit ATS Defendants, Except to Bar Suits 
Against Foreign Sovereigns. 
Since the statute is ambiguous, it is worthwhile to examine the 
legislative history to understand how the ATS incorporated the law of 
nations in the eighteenth century, and how it incorporates today’s 
customary international law. 
1. Historical Background 
The Alien Tort Statute—codified by the First U.S. Congress, and 
signed by George Washington—has remained essentially unchanged 
since its codification in section 9 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, but 
its use, even at the time of enactment, was unknown.  From 1789–1980, 
federal courts heard only two ATS cases.  The first, a 1795 admiralty 
case, invoked a violation of a U.S. treaty;143 the second, a 1961 custody 
dispute, pleaded a violation of the law of nations.144  Neither decision 
provided any substantial interpretation of the ambiguous text. 
The Supreme Court has comprehensively analyzed the ATS only 
once, in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain.145  Justice Souter lamented that the 
“poverty of drafting history,” regarding the Alien Tort provision, makes 
it “fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended 
has proven elusive.”146  The lack of legislative record, however, has been 
compensated by a wealth of subsequent scholarship on the subject.147  
Because open-ended statutory terms were not clarified by the legislative 
history, the Court thoroughly plumbed the historical record to gain a 
sense of the statute in the context of its time. 
Given its rare usage, commentators, historians, and jurists have 
proposed several possible motivations for passing the ATS.  The Framers 
may have felt a moral duty to open their courts to aliens: “Cursed is 
anyone who withholds justice from the foreigner . . . .”148  Congress may 
have been attempting pragmatic statecraft by demonstrating to the world 
                                                                                                                  
 143 Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). 
 144 Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). 
 145 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  While Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, is the only significant 
Supreme Court decision regarding the Alien Tort Statute, it is not the only ATS claim to 
come before the Court.  See also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (decided one 
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 146 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004). 
 147 E.g., M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original 
Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERK. J. INT’L L. 316 (2009) (The word 
“foreigner” in the Senate’s first draft was changed to “alien”). 
 148 Deuteronomy 27:19. 
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how the fledgling nation was paying “decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind.”149  One scholar posited that “tort” referred exclusively to 
naval prize cases.150  The Supreme Court surmised that the law of nations 
in the era of the Framers included bodies of norms such as lex 
mercatoria and the laws of war, and the ATS at the time of drafting 
probably would have comprehended three international law torts 
described by Blackstone in England’s criminal law: maritime piracy, 
offenses against ambassadors, and the violation of safe conducts.151  
Another theory, recently voiced by Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit, 
asserts that the ATS solved Congress’s “incapacity to deal with such 
matters as the Marbois Incident.”152  (When François Marbois, a French 
consul, was assaulted in 1784, Congress “lacked any judicial authority in 
Pennsylvania,” where this tort occurred, and could only “act[] as a 
cheerleader to the Pennsylvania courts.”153) 
The Supreme Court had good reason to spend so much time in the 
18th century when deciding Sosa: it is axiomatic that a law should be 
interpreted in light of the evils it was designed to prevent.154  Thus, 
references to William Blackstone,155 nods to Alexander Hamilton,156 and 
discussions of Bolchos157 remain de rigueur today.  Further speculation 
on this front, however, is not likely to inform the debate about corporate 
ATS liability.  Another method of discerning legislative intent might be 
to look at how the Framers might have expected the statute to be 
interpreted in their own day. 
                                                                                                                  
 149 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
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COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769)). Cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
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638 (K.B.) (Lord Coke). 
 155 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES). 
 156 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 784 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 157 Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (discussed in Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
68 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 8:43 
2. Construing Corporate Responsibility in Federal Courts—Early 
1800s 
Given the paucity of drafting history and the likelihood that the 
Supreme Court will revisit historical sources when it hears this issue, it 
might be useful to explore how the statute would have been interpreted 
around the time of its passage. As it so happens, a contemporaneous 
interpretation of a similar statute exists. 
In Bank of the United States v. M’Kenzie, a legal entity 
incorporated in Pennsylvania brought suit for nonpayment of a loan 
against a debtor in Virginia.158  McKenzie defaulted in 1821.159  When 
the bank sued in 1828, Virginia’s statute of limitations barred the suit.160  
The bank argued that it could not have violated the statute of limitations 
because the statute did not apply to corporations.161  On demurrer, Chief 
Justice Marshall rejected the bank’s argument: 
The enacting clause does not contemplate the character of the 
plaintiff, but looks singly to the action itself . . . . In construing 
this section, it is entirely unimportant, by whom the suit is 
brought.  The action is equally barred by length of time, whoever 
may be the plaintiff.  The plain words of the statute are decisive. 
Nor does any reason of justice or policy exist, which should take 
a corporation out of these words.  The legislature could have no 
motive for limiting the time, within which a suit should be 
brought by an individual, which does not apply with equal force 
to a suit brought by a corporation.162 
Marshall’s two responses to the bank’s contention—one based on 
the statutory language, the other based on policy—can be analogously 
applied to reject the argument of the Kiobel majority that the Alien Tort 
Statute forbids corporations as defendants.  The enacting clause of the 
ATS does not contemplate the character of the defendant; instead, it 
looks to the action itself and the nature of the plaintiff.163  The plain 
words decisively allow any civil action, whoever the defendant may be.  
Moreover, no reason of justice or policy exists to excise corporate 
defendants from the ATS.  International law could have no motive for 
imposing human rights obligations on sovereigns and natural persons 
without imposing them equally strongly on juridical persons.  To the 
                                                                                                                  
 158 Bank of United States v. M’Kenzie, 2 Brock 393, 2 F.Cas. 718, 721 (Cir. Ct. D. 
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 161 Id. at 719–20. 
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 163 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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contrary, human rights law has an abiding interest in protecting the civil, 
political, and judicial rights of all people from any and all infringers.  
The ATS, by its own terms, therefore would apply with equal force to a 
natural person, or a corporate person. 
C.  The majority erred in its interpretation of Sosa 
“[W]e are required,” Judge Cabranes wrote, “to look to 
international law to determine whether corporate liability for a ‘violation 
of the law of nations’ . . . . is a norm ‘accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity . . . .’”164  Required?  International law does not 
require this inquiry.  The statute does not require this inquiry either, as 
explained above.  No other federal law requires this limitation.  Rather, 
the source of this “requirement” is footnote 20 of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.165 
The Sosa decision has attracted some criticism for its lack of 
clarity.166  The Kiobel majority made four errors reading Sosa, two of 
which involved erroneous reliance on footnote 20.  First, the footnote 
draws a distinction between public actors (sovereigns) and private actors 
(individuals and corporations),167 but the majority’s further distinction 
between individuals and corporations was not warranted.  Second, the 
majority failed to appreciate the policy reasons underlying footnote 20’s 
distinction, and failed to place it in context.  Third, the majority’s 
repeated reference to procedural “norms” of international law gives that 
word a broader sense than it was given by the Supreme Court.  Fourth, 
the implications of the majority’s position lead to logical conclusions that 
would likely have been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
1. Footnote 20 Invokes the Public/Private International Law 
Dichotomy, and Makes No Distinction Among Private Entities 
Footnote 20 in Sosa is ambiguous.  It states: “A related 
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability 
for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”168  The 
footnote then cites discussions of the public/private distinction in Tel-
                                                                                                                  
 164 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing the ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and 
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Oren and Kadic.169  This sentence could be read to differentiate between 
public and private actors.  It could further be read to differentiate 
between individual private actors and corporate private actors. 
The majority is not wrong to consider the nature of the actor who 
allegedly violated the law of nations.  Violations of the law of nations 
often turn on this distinction.  To use Judge Friendly’s famous example, 
if a private individual or an agent of a private corporation takes property 
from a foreigner, he has violated a universally accepted rule frequently 
rendered, “thou shalt not steal,” but he has not violated the law of 
nations.170 The same act, if carried out under color of State law, would 
now be called uncompensated “expropriation,” which is a remediable 
violation of customary international law.171  For another example, when 
an individual ties up his neighbor and beats him, demanding to know 
who damaged his roof, the victim has been tortured, but he has a claim 
only for false imprisonment and battery.  But if a government worker 
seizes a foreigner, confines him, and brutalizes him to obtain 
information, he has committed official torture.172  No one would deny 
that it violates the law of nations. 
The essential difference between theft and expropriation is the 
character of the actor.  That difference also transforms a battery, a private 
wrong, into torture, an offense against civilization itself.  It should go 
without saying, and the majority acknowledges, that the nature of the 
actor is frequently the deciding factor as to whether there has been a 
violation of the law of nations.173  For norms such as these, the nature of 
the perpetrator is relevant to the nature of the violation.  But no State 
action is required for other norms, such as those prohibiting human 
trafficking, genocide, war crimes, piracy, hijacking of aircraft, or, as 
alleged in Kiobel, aiding and abetting a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights.174 
In support of its inquiry into whether international law assigns 
corporate liability, the majority also quotes Justice Breyer’s concurring 
opinion in Sosa, which interpreted footnote 20 to mean that “[t]he norm 
[of international law] must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g. 
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a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.”175  However, Justice Breyer 
misinterpreted footnote 20.  ATS jurisdiction does not depend on 
whether liability is assigned to certain perpetrators.  Rather, the test is 
whether the law of nations is violated. 
Consider a child soldier who enlists his young friends.  Liability 
could not be imposed against him because no international tribunal is 
competent to try juvenile offenders,176 but he has, unquestionably, 
violated the law of nations.177  Under Justice Breyer’s interpretation, the 
child has committed no violation.  That is wrong.  Footnote 20 is not 
among Justice Souter’s most artful sentences, but it is meant to tread the 
familiar line between public and private international law.  The Kiobel 
majority should not have adopted Justice Breyer’s assertion as its rule of 
decision.   
2. Policy Interests Underlie Scope of Liability Inquiry 
Footnote 20 implicates the “scope of liability,” which is not a 
principle of international law.  Rather, it is a term of art in tort law in the 
area of proximate causation.  The Supreme Court guided lower courts to 
first determine whether an ATS complaint alleged violation of a specific 
and universal norm, and, if this jurisdictional requirement is met, a court 
must then ascertain whether it would be advisable for a U.S. court to hear 
the matter.178  Footnote 20 occurs in the context of the second inquiry 
into justiciability, an issue that the Supreme Court did not reach in Sosa 
because Alvarez’s claim was dismissed on its merits. 
Lower courts must avoid enmeshing the United States in 
international disputes by considering several relevant factors, one of 
which, described in footnote 20, dealt with the scope of liability extended 
by customary international law.  This “additional consideration”179 was 
meant to help judges evaluate the potential repercussions if liability were 
to be imposed by a United States court. Plainly, certain cases may 
present defendants over whom it is not appropriate to exercise federal 
jurisdiction, even if jurisdictional criteria are otherwise met.  In such 
cases, general justiciability limitations may justify dismissal in isolated 
cases for reasons of forum non conveniens, comity, or sovereign 
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immunity.  The instruction should not generate categorical exclusion of a 
certain class of defendants. 
Thus, this inquiry is important, not because the statute requires it, 
but rather because it implicates the general justiciability principles that 
constrain the federal judiciary.  The Kiobel court erred by inquiring 
whether international law extends liability to a specific type of defendant 
without considering the policy rationale for this judicially created 
inquiry.  The Second Circuit’s intense focus on corporate liability does 
not serve the purposes animating the edicts of Congress, the prerogatives 
of the executive branch, or the abiding global interests in human rights 
protection. 
3. “Norms” of International Law in Sosa Are Substantive, Not 
Procedural 
The word “prohibition” could be substituted for every instance of 
the word “norm” in Justices Souter’s, Scalia’s, and Breyer’s Sosa 
opinions.  Some exemplars: “[t]he determination whether a norm is 
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action . . . ;”180 “[s]ince 
enforcement of an international norm by one nation’s courts implies that 
other nations’ courts may do the same . . . ;”181 and “[o]ne of the norms at 
issue in that case was the norm against genocide. . . . ”182 The Kiobel 
minority correctly understood that “norms,” as that word was used by the 
Supreme Court, indicate rules of conduct.183   
 By contrast, the majority in Kiobel uses the word “norm” to 
means something akin to “principle.”  For example, “provisions 
imposing corporate liability in some recent specialized treaties have not 
established corporate liability as a norm of customary international 
law.”184  According to Judge Leval, the majority erred by using the word 
to indicate rules of procedure, rules of jurisdiction, rules of liability, or 
rules of remedies. 185 
The majority’s use of the term “norm” in different subtle ways 
throughout the opinion renders its decision less legitimate.  Consider: 
“[t]he defining legal achievement of the Nuremberg trials is that they 
explicitly recognized individual liability for the violation of specific, 
universal, and obligatory norms of international human rights,”186 but 
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“international tribunals have consistently declined to recognize corporate 
liability as a norm of customary international law,”187 and “[o]ur 
recognition of a norm of liability as a matter of domestic law, therefore, 
cannot create a norm of customary international law.”188  This 
broadening of the term means that some norms of international law no 
longer provide the substantive basis for violations of the law. 
Incidentally, it is possible to reach the majority’s conclusion 
without a confused reference to “norms.”  As Julian Ku wrote, “neither 
historic nor contemporary international precedents establish a consensus 
in favor of imposing liability on private corporations, particularly with 
respect to violations of jus cogens norms.”189  However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court evidently preferred to use “norm” vaguely, and avoided 
any mention of jus cogens. 
4. The Majority’s Conclusion Parallels an Argument Rejected in 
Sosa 
The Kiobel majority also failed to take into account the spirit of the 
“rule” it was discovering.  Álvarez-Machaín asserted that “his arrest was 
arbitrary and as such forbidden by international law not because it 
infringed the prerogatives of Mexico, but because no applicable law 
authorized it.”190  The Supreme Court swatted this argument away, 
stating that the plaintiff was improperly invoking a “general 
prohibition . . . regardless of the circumstances” and indicated that he 
was redefining the word “arbitrary” to create a “broad rule.”191  
However, in a similar fashion, the Kiobel majority in essence asserts 
corporate liability is forbidden under the ATS, not because international 
law’s prerogatives are infringed, but because there is no universal norm 
authorizing it.  Thus the majority’s line of reasoning is as specious as 
Álvarez-Machaín’s: it invokes a general prohibition—the lack of civil 
corporate liability or criminal corporate liability in international fora—to 
create a broad rule, that those entities are not subjects of human rights 
law.  To paraphrase Justice Souter: this view would support corporate 
immunity from ATS claims in federal court, for any human rights abuse, 
anywhere in the world, without any cognizance of Congress’s power to 
establish the jurisdiction of the federal courts.192  In short, international 
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law would trump federal law to determine this aspect of jurisdiction in 
American courts.   
That result would be unconstitutional. Argentine Republic should 
have informed the Kiobel majority’s construction of the ATS, as it 
illustrates the “settled proposition that the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the lower federal courts is determined by Congress ‘in the exact degrees 
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public 
good.’”193  
This principle indicates that Congress, not international law, has the 
exclusive power to expand or limit its own jurisdictional provisions.  
Congress controls the field when it comes to limitations on ATS 
defendants.  The Kiobel majority, by contrast, held that international law, 
not federal law, decides whether corporations can be ATS defendants.194  
The majority’s holding gives international law more power over the 
jurisdictional provisions of United States courts than Congress has.195   
The majority was wrong to fill the ATS gap—its silence regarding 
defendants—with international law.  Furthermore, by the majority’s own 
admission, it has merely discovered that no international tribunal is 
equipped with jurisdiction over transnational corporations with power to 
assign damages against them.  Human rights law is meant to be 
universal, and the majority shows no evidence that international law 
excludes corporations from the universe.  The lack of a positive principle 
of corporate exclusion is just as suspicious as the lack of a positive 
principle of corporate liability.  Thus, just as the ATS does not indicate a 
party that may be sued, there is a gap in international law regarding 
corporate liability.  The majority thus interprets an exclusion, and fills 
the ATS gap regarding defendants with this judge-made rule. 
D.  The ATS is 20 Years Old, Not 200 
1. 102nd Congress: Approves Filártiga, and Expressly Allows Two 
Causes of Action 
In 1991, the 102nd Congress considered the limited usefulness of 
the ATS over the past 200 years and its revival by the modern line of 
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ATS jurisprudence.  In the legislative record, Congress approved of 
Filártiga by name and endorsed subsequent cases that vindicated human 
rights abuses in U.S. courts.  In its new human rights context, Congress 
saw two problems with the present wording of the ATS.  First, foreigners 
ought not to be given more access to U.S. courts than U.S. citizens enjoy.  
Second, judges faced the difficult task of formulating causes of action 
when neither international law nor federal law explicitly provided a right 
to sue for human rights abuses.  Congress solved these two dilemmas in 
an unusual way.  It passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 
(“TVPA”) alongside the ATS, as a Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350.196 
As one Congressman explained, the TVPA would “enhance the 
remedy already available under section 1350 in an important respect: 
While the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the 
TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have 
been tortured abroad.”197  This statement also validates Filártiga’s 
holding that the ATS could be applied to conduct that occurred outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.198  Congress selected two 
jus cogens violations of international law and formed two causes of 
action—covering the torts of torture and extrajudicial killing—for which 
the ATS would provide jurisdiction.199  Even though Judge Bork’s 
concurring opinion in Tel-Oren had not been followed, Congress 
evidently worried about his refusal to hear a case without an express 
grant of jurisdiction over definite causes of action.  “The TVPA would 
provide such a grant . . . .  At the same time, claims based on torture or 
summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may 
appropriately be covered by [the ATS].”200  Consequently, “[t]hat statute 
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already 
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international 
law.”201 
While Congress was deliberating the TVPA, it could have replaced 
or amended the archaic-sounding ATS.  Instead of doing so, Congress 
enshrined two substantive causes of action as an explanatory Note to this 
jurisdictional statute, simultaneously validating and abrogating Bork’s 
concerns.  This Note could be monumentally helpful to jurists.  First of 
all, Congress has taken a direct stand on what might have been a dubious 
                                                                                                                  
 196 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
 197 H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991); see also S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 137–38 
(1991). 
 198 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 625 F.3d 561, 563–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)). 
 199 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 200 H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991). 
 201 H.R. REP. NO. 102-367 (1991) (emphasis added). 
76 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 8:43 
interpretation of this statute and expressed clear approval of the modern 
construction that has emerged since Filártiga. Second, these two 
“sample” causes of action should assist judges in the formulation of new 
categories of claims. 
In passing the TVPA, Congress essentially re-enacted the ATS, 
giving it a modern meaning and a modern intention, despite its use of the 
passé vernacular “law of nations.”  While a nominal nod to the 18th 
century drafters may not be inappropriate, the interpretive adventure 
begins anew with what Congress intended this ambiguous sentence to 
mean at the time of its (re)enacting.  The ATS now unequivocally 
provides jurisdiction for causes of action based on violations of human 
rights norms. 
The legislative history further indicates an intention that the TVPA 
apply to abuses perpetrated abroad.  “Judicial protections against flagrant 
human rights violations are often least effective in those countries where 
such abuses are most prevalent.  A state that practices torture and 
summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law . . . .  The 
Torture Victim Protection Act would respond to this situation.”202  
Nevertheless, appellate judges are split on the issue of ATS 
extraterritoriality.  Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit recently stated 
that the ATS cannot be applied to acts occurring outside the U.S., finding 
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it has none.”203  Another court has held that the ATS applies 
only extraterritorially.204  Defendants have argued that the TVPA 
supplants or preempts the ATS.205  This construction has been rejected.206  
However, the TVPA ought to inform how judges craft new causes of 
action based on other norms of customary international law.  TVPA 
causes of action are subject to several limitations: plaintiffs are limited; a 
                                                                                                                  
 202 H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991). 
 203 Sarei, 625 F.3d at 563–64 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2878). 
 204 See Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he Court 
has not found a single post-Filartiga case addressing claims arising out of domestic 
conduct; all of the conduct of which Velez complains occurred in the United States . . . . 
Velez’s claims of domestic human trafficking and forced labor are not within Filartiga’s 
conception of the statute’s grant of jurisdiction.”). 
 205 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004). 
 206 E.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250–51 
(11th Cir. 2005); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp 2d 1164, 1178 n.13 
(C.D. Cal. 2005).  Contra Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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statute of limitations of ten years is imposed; and exhaustion of 
“adequate and available” remedies abroad is a prerequisite.207 
The legislative history indicates minimal consideration of the scope 
of liability, but it does lay out clear prioritization of policy: “There are, 
of course, situations in which application of this statute could create 
difficulties in our relations with friendly countries.  But this is a small 
price to pay in order to see that justice is done for the victims of 
torture.”208 In response to a question about viable defendants, one 
Senator indicated an expansive scope of liability.209  Except for those 
who enjoy diplomatic or sovereign immunity, “only defendants over 
which a court in the United States has personal jurisdiction may be 
sued.”210 
To sum up, Congress considered changing the ATS, but opted for 
flexibility by retaining the original language.  This ought to be 
considered a recent reenactment of the statute that explicitly approves of 
its application to causes of action for two jus cogens violations that 
would have no other territorial connection to the United States.  Congress 
also explicitly intended for those causes of action to be illustrative and 
not exhaustive.  Congress further assumed the “gap” regarding 
defendants would be filled by federal law—statutory immunity for 
foreign sovereigns and personal jurisdiction limitations that exclude 
defendants with no ties to the United States. 
2. Construing Corporate Liability Under the TVPA: A Circuit Split 
Because the TVPA should inform any interpretation of the ATS, it 
is worthwhile to ask whether the TVPA applies to corporations.211  The 
TVPA states that “[a]n individual . . .  who subjects an individual to 
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual.”212  
Unlike the ATS, which only mentions plaintiffs, the TVPA refers to both 
plaintiffs and defendants.  Circuit courts are split as to whether the term 
used to characterize defendants—individual—includes legal persons. 
A district court within the Eleventh Circuit allowed a torture claim 
against a corporation, accepting plaintiff’s argument “that by imposing 
liability on ‘individuals who subject others to torture or extrajudicial 
                                                                                                                  
 207 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728, 731 (discussing the TVPA generally); see also Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (indicating the Court might find the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement 
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 208 137 Cong. Rec. H 11,244-04 (1991). 
 209 S. REP. NO. 102-249 (1991). 
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 211 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 212 Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992). 
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killing,’ the word ‘individual’ is equivalent to ‘person’ . . . . 
[C]orporations are generally treated as persons in other areas of law[;] 
therefore, liability under the TVPA should also extend to 
corporations.”213  To support this holding, the Court looked to legislative 
intent and to precedent.  It found no legislative intent to create “any 
exemption for private corporations, and courts have held corporations 
liable for violations of international law under the related AT[S].”214  
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Clinton v. New York recently held that 
the term ‘‘individual’’ is synonymous with ‘‘person,’’ acknowledging 
that ‘‘‘person’ often has a broader meaning in the law’’ than in ordinary 
usage.215  [I]t is reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended to 
exclude corporations from liability under the TVPA, it could and would 
have expressly stated so.216  The Ninth Circuit then reached the opposite 
conclusion: 
Congress’s use of the word “individual” throughout the statute 
indicates that it did not intend for the TVPA to apply to 
corporations.  Indeed, Congress [in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1] has directed courts to presume the word “individual” in a 
statute refers to natural persons and not corporations . . . . 
[However, that presumption did not apply where a] statute used 
the words “individual” and “person” interchangeably throughout. 
Here, in contrast, it is evident that Congress drafted the TVPA in 
such a manner as to limit liability to natural persons.  The TVPA 
consistently uses “individual” throughout the statute to refer both 
to the torturer and the victim of torture.  (“An individual who . . . 
subjects an individual to torture.”).  Corporations, of course, 
cannot be tortured [because they] cannot suffer physical injury.  
Plaintiffs ask us to give the same word different meanings in the 
same statute.  They ask us to interpret “individual” to mean a 
natural person when referring to the victim, but to mean either a 
natural person or a corporation when referring to the torturer.  
This interpretation of the statute runs counter to the “normal rule 
of statutory construction that identical words used in different 
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”  
                                                                                                                  
 213 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358–59 (S.D. Fla. 2003), 
aff’d 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998). 
 216 Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1358–59. (internal citations omitted). 
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There is no indication Congress intended “individual” to have a 
variety of meanings throughout the TVPA.217 
Even before Kiobel, the Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth, 
using similar reasoning: 
Under the TVPA, the term “individual” describes both those who 
can violate its proscriptions against torture, as well as those who 
can be victims of torture . . . . “[B]oth from context and common 
sense only natural persons can be the ‘individual’ victims of acts 
that inflict ‘severe pain and suffering.’  Because the TVPA uses 
same term ‘individual’ to identify offenders, the definition of 
‘individual’ within the statute appears to refer to a human being, 
suggesting that only natural persons can violate the Act.” 218 
After Kiobel, the D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion as well.219 
This reasoning essentially grants corporations complete immunity from 
TVPA torture claims.  Since a corporation cannot be tortured it cannot 
commit torture either, unless we give the same word two different 
meanings.  (Paradoxically, while corporate defendants embrace this 
argument, they reject the similar logic of Harold Koh’s parity idea.220)  
An alternative to either interpretation is that Congress’s consistent 
use of the word “individual” was meant to stand in contraposition to the 
word “alien” in the ATS.  That is, Congress intended to increase the class 
of possible claimants to comprise U.S. nationals as well as aliens, and 
did not take a position on holding Chevron or Coca-Cola accountable.221 
The legislative context supports this interpretation.  In 1991, no 
ATS claim had attempted to hold a corporate entity liable for 
international torts.  Doe v. Unocal, the first ATS claim that sustained 
jurisdiction against a corporate defendant, was not filed until 1996.222  
Congress most likely never anticipated the aiding and abetting actions 
that have arisen since the TVPA was passed.  As the title of the act 
indicates, Congress was focused on the victims—not the perpetrators—
                                                                                                                  
 217 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 218 Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d at 254, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2007) 
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J., dissenting). 
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 221 See Eric Engle, The Torture Victim’s Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
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of torture.  Moreover, the title of a statute may be considered when 
construing its meaning.223 
Because the alternative construction may be just as specious as 
those advanced by the circuits, we may fall back on maxims of statutory 
construction to at least obtain consistency in the result.  But the warring 
canons of interpretation here similarly have no clear winner.  On the one 
hand, “[t]he same language used repeatedly in the same connection is 
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the statute . . . .”224  
However, “[t]his presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary 
to assign different meanings to make the statute consistent.”225  It is true 
that a corporation cannot be tortured, so it cannot not be a victim under 
the TVPA.  (Anticompetitive practices or over-regulation may 
analogously “hurt” a corporation’s bottom line, but they do not count.  
The ordinary meaning of “torture” involves physical injury.)  But the 
converse—that a corporation, acting through its agents, could not commit 
torture—is not true.  To give “individual” the same meaning in both 
places would lead to an absurd conclusion.  “Nothing is better settled 
than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will 
effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an 
unjust or an absurd conclusion.”226  As Justice Scalia instructs: “[a] text 
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; 
it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”227 
As the foregoing analysis indicates, both interpretations of the 
TVPA are unreasonable.  If “individual” includes corporations as 
perpetrators but not as victims of torture, then the construction is absurd, 
though the result fairly realizes Congress’s intent to secure justice for 
victims.  If “individual” does not include corporations, then the word has 
a consistent meaning throughout the sentence, but the result eliminates 
the concept of respondeat superior for torture cases.  This is the key 
issue which the Supreme Court must resolve.  True to form, however, the 
Court will likely resolve the matter on ideological lines.  Perhaps, then, 
Congress should resolve the ambiguity that it created itself.228 
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IV. WHICH LAW PROVIDES THE CAUSE OF ACTION? 
The Supreme Court has held that the ATS provides jurisdiction 
only.  With one exception—the Torture Victim’s Protection Act—no law 
explicitly grants causes of action to alien plaintiffs.  The cases against 
Shell, Firestone, and Exxon, however, all allege corporate liability on a 
theory of aiding and abetting, which is not covered under the TVPA.  
Where should a plaintiff look to see whether he or she has a case?  Three 
bodies of law seem plausible: international law itself, lex loci (the law of 
the place where the harm occurred), or U.S. federal common law.  After 
the jurisdictional issue was settled in Filártiga v. Peña Irala, the district 
court took an extraordinary approach to answering this question. 
A.  Patchwork Cause of Action 
Peña did not participate in the proceedings after the Second 
Circuit’s landmark opinion,229 but before default judgment could be 
lodged against him, the district court realized that while the issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction had been settled, it still needed to contend 
with the ambiguity of the statute: 
[What is] the nature of the “action” over which the [ATS] affords 
jurisdiction[?]  Does the “tort” to which the statute refers mean a 
wrong “in violation of the law of nations” or merely a wrong 
actionable under the law of the appropriate sovereign state?  The 
latter construction would make the violation of international law 
pertinent only to afford jurisdiction.  The court would then, in 
accordance with traditional conflict of laws principles, apply the 
substantive law of [the place the tort occurred].  If the “tort” to 
which the statute refers is the violation of international law, the 
court must look to that body of law to determine what substantive 
principles to apply.230 
The court found two reasons to look to the law of nations for the 
substantive cause of action.  First, it is a better policy: if the ATS was 
solely jurisdictional, and the cause of action had to be provided by the 
sovereign State where it occurred, it could “invit[e] frustration of the 
purposes of international law by individual states that enact immunities 
for government personnel or other such exemptions or limitations.”231  
                                                                                                                  
 229 Peña had been deported for overstaying his visa.  Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 
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Second, in U.S. federal courts, it makes sense to apply international law 
because U.S. common law incorporates the customary law of nations.232 
Turning to Filártiga, the court found customary international law, 
as recorded in the U.N.’s torture convention, enjoins the nations of the 
world to compensate torture victims “in accordance with national 
law.”233  Following the instructions of the law of nations, the court 
looked to the laws of Paraguay.234  It found that Paraguay’s Constitution 
prohibited the act of torture, that its criminal code penalized torturers, 
and that its civil code provided remedies of pecuniary damages, “moral 
damage[s],” and costs and attorney’s fees, but not punitive damages.235  
However, the court perceived that “punishment is an appropriate 
objective under the law of nations,” and, since “the interests of the global 
community transcend those of any one state,” the court “conclude[d] that 
it is essential and proper to grant the remedy of punitive damages in 
order to give effect to the manifest objectives of the international 
prohibition against torture.”236 
Importantly, the district court recognized the international law norm 
condemning torture into a judge-made common-law private right of 
action that allowed redress of tortious conduct in U.S. courts.237  To 
accomplish this task, it drew on the recorded norms of international 
(criminal) law to formulate that a cause of action existed.238  Then, 
because international law deferred to individual nations for enforcement, 
the court consulted the interests of international law before applying 
remedies available (only) under U.S. law.239  Judge Katzmann, as 
discussed above, made this process explicit in Khulumani, detailing how 
the Second Circuit “has consistently relied on criminal law norms in 
establishing the content of customary international law for purposes of 
the AT[S].”240 
This is patchwork-quilt jurisprudence.  But it reflects a well-
reasoned interpretive solution grounded in a moral imperative to prevent 
norms of international law from becoming “mere benevolent yearnings 
never to be given effect.”241 
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B.  “Arising Under” vs. “In Violation Of” 
The problem of the cause of action in ATS cases has bedeviled 
judges and advocates.  The statute provides jurisdiction only, so a cause 
of action must either be found or formulated.  Judge Bork in Tel-Oren 
would require that plaintiffs find causes of action arising under 
international law.  The Kiobel majority agreed, noting that international 
law has created causes of action in other contexts, and that some of the 
rules of law are procedural rather than substantive.242  For example, 
maritime pirates or human rights violators could be subject to universal 
jurisdiction for their offenses, because universal jurisdiction is a specific 
and universal norm that has arisen over time by custom.243 
The ATS, by its terms, does not require that an explicit cause of 
action be found in a specific body of law.  In this respect, the ATS differs 
from the other statutes that confer jurisdiction in federal courts.  For 
federal question jurisdiction, “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”244  A civil action does not arise under a law 
or treaty unless the law or the treaty explicitly provides for such lawsuits. 
The Kiobel majority, like Bork, erred by treating the ATS as if it 
contains the words “arising under.”  As the Second Circuit noted in 
Kadic, “[b]ecause the Alien Tort Act requires that plaintiffs plead a 
‘violation of the law of nations’ at the jurisdictional threshold, this statute 
requires a more searching review of the merits to establish jurisdiction 
than is required under the more flexible ‘arising under’ formula of 
section 1331.”245  The court stated that ATS claims had heightened 
pleading standards that require plaintiffs to “adequately plead[] a 
violation of the law of nations,” and not “merely a colorable 
violation.”246 
Since the passage of the TVPA, the searching review need not be so 
perplexing.  Congress reviewed the policy reasons favoring and 
disfavoring the extensive litigation under the ATS; it concluded that U.S. 
leadership on human rights was a national priority, and it provided civil 
remedies to be an effective way of imposing justice on oppressors.  
Furthermore, the TVPA’s causes of action are examples that should 
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serve to clear up some of the “lurking issues” in ATS jurisprudence.247  
The ATS absolutely applies extraterritorially.248  Principles of exhaustion 
apply, so plaintiffs must first fail to obtain judicial remedies in the place 
where the tort occurred or show the attempt to be futile, before 
petitioning U.S. courts for relief under the ATS.  There is no indication 
that such an attempt was made in Nigeria by the Wiwa/Kiobel 
plaintiffs.249 
V. THE KIOBEL MAJORITY ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW OF NATIONS 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that international law 
must hold a corporation liable for a human rights violation before the 
ATS will do so, the majority should have undertaken a thorough review 
of corporate liability in international law.  The majority rightly begins at 
Nuremberg, where modern human rights law was born.  But the majority 
fails to consider some sources that ought to have been considered.  
International fora have imposed civil liability against corporate actors for 
aiding and abetting human rights atrocities.  The preeminent and 
precedent-setting example of this practice comes from I.G. Farben.  In 
this regard, Kiobel exercised an unforgivable lack of imagination when 
consulting sources of international law. 
A.  Civil Litigation Against I.G. Farben Establishes an International 
Norm of Corporate Liability 
The Kiobel majority found that international law supported liability 
for individuals, but not corporations, in the trial of I.G. Farben executives 
(but not Farben itself) in the wake of World War II.250  Although the 
Farben trial was carried out by an American Military Tribunal, both the 
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have treated the Nuremberg trials 
as “international tribunals.”251  The decisions of these tribunals, along 
with decisions of the International Court of Justice, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, are accorded great weight. 
The majority felt it was decisive that there was no criminal liability 
for Farben in 1948, and no liability for corporations in international 
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criminal courts thereafter.  The minority contested this point on logical 
grounds: a lack of criminal liability in the 1940s should not logically 
imply a lack of civil liability for present-day corporate malfeasance.252  
The majority shot back that “the customary international law of human 
rights does not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, 
criminal, or otherwise).”253 
However, liability was imposed on I.G. Farben.  After the war, the 
Allies concluded that Farben could not continue to exist in its current 
form.  Allied forces ordered the company to wind up business, instituted 
a “decartelization,” and broke the company into smaller units.254  This 
“corporate capital punishment” was entirely appropriate, and it was 
carried out under the auspices of the same Allied coalition that 
established the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and individual 
liability for crimes committed during wartime.  This point was picked up 
by both the Seventh Circuit and D.C. Circuit, which cite several laws of 
the Allied Control Council.255  In 1945, “[l]egally, the corporation was 
under Allied control and was managed and represented to the outside 
world by the Tri-partite I.G. Farben Control Group (TRIFCOG).”256 
The documents surrounding the dissolution of Farben are 
intriguing.  The goal of this corporate division did not appear to be an 
appropriation of assets as prizes of war.  Rather, the company breakup 
was seen to be a just solution: nothing bearing Farben’s name could ever 
be allowed to profit again.  It effectively refutes the majority’s contention 
that the law of nations has never imposed any form of liability on a 
corporation.   
Yet another indicator of the majority’s myopia was a failure to 
mention Farben’s liability for the torts it committed against individuals.  
Although Farben continued to exist “in liquidation” until 2003, it was 
beset by claims from those it had enslaved during the war. 
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A young man named Norbert Wollheim had been deemed “fit for 
work” on the ramp at Auschwitz in early 1943.  He was transferred to 
Buna camp, where he was forced to work under constant threat of death 
from SS guards until the arrival of Stalin’s troops in 1945.  In 1950, 
living in Lübeck after the war, Wollheim heard of the liquidation, asked 
an attorney to look into the matter, brought the legal issue before 
TRIFCOG, and was given permission to file a claim.  “Permission for 
institution of proceedings was required because German courts no longer 
had jurisdiction over I.G. Farben following its sequestration in 1945.”257 
TRIFCOG was an international body, and it indicated that a civil claim 
could go forward against a corporate defendant. 
Wollhiem filed his suit in Frankfurt am Regional Court, alleging 
harms suffered during his forced labor, and demanding 10,000 Deutsche 
Marks in compensation ($42,000 in 1951, roughly $365,000 in 2011).258  
Farben was assigned an attorney, who argued that the SS, not Farben, 
was responsible for Wollheim’s detention and maltreatment.  Unable to 
reach a settlement, Wollheim prepared for trial using many of the 
materials compiled by prosecutors for Case 6 of the Nuremberg 
Tribunals against the company’s executives.  After eight days of 
testimony from other laborers and Farben managers, the Frankfurt court 
found for Wollheim, and explicitly held that the corporation breached an 
affirmative duty to ensure humane treatment of its workers: 
[F]rom the abovementioned statements of the witnesses for the 
accused, the court infers an appalling indifference on the part of 
the accused and its people to the plaintiff and the Jewish 
prisoners, an indifference that is comprehensible only if one 
assumes, with the plaintiff, that the defendant and its people at 
that time really did not consider the plaintiff and the Jewish 
prisoners to be full-fledged human beings, toward whom a duty 
of care existed.259 
Although this judgment was issued by a national court in Germany, 
the Allied tribunal granted jurisdiction because the German court did not 
have kompetenz-kompetenz for this dispute.260  This means that a 
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precedent exists of an international tribunal granting personal and 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil action for a tort committed in 
violation of the law of nations by a juridical entity.  Prima facie 
violations of human rights (in this case, forced labor) were established.261  
After jurisdiction was granted under international law, the case 
proceeded according to the domestic law of Germany (a foreshadowing 
of the district court’s patchwork solution in Filártiga).  And importantly, 
the court’s judgment was against Farben which now had international 
legal personality.262  Wollheim’s claim has several points of similarity 
with subsequent ATS actions against corporations, and it should have 
direct bearing on whether the courts of the Second Circuit can hear the 
case against Royal Dutch/Shell. 
Wollheim’s victory inspired another suit by Rudolf Waschmann, 
who was 17 when he was sent to Monowitz camp in 1943.  He 
performed forced labor for I.G. Farben until the war’s conclusion.  He 
then emigrated to the U.S., became a citizen in 1950, was drafted into the 
military, and transferred to a post in Germany.  As a U.S. service 
member, he had recourse to file suit in a court established by the Allied 
High Commission in Manheim—an actual international tribunal—that 
followed American procedural law but used German substantive law.263  
The case was quickly settled, but crucially, this occurred after 
jurisdiction had been granted.264 
The civil actions against Farben, far from showing an international 
custom that precludes corporate liability, instead show that the 
international community has: (1) set a relatively low bar for corporate 
veil-piercing (there was relatively little discussion as to whether Farben’s 
executives could be tried as war criminals for participation in Hitler’s 
“Final Solution”); (2) established the ability to effectively impose a 
“death sentence” of sorts—bankruptcy—against a corporation; and (3) 
further allowed individual victims of human rights abuses to sue for the 
individualized harms they suffered.  Other post-Kiobel scholarship has 
affirmed the implications of Farben’s liability for “regulating corporate 
activity in conflict zones.”265  Judge Cabranes, writing that 
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“[international law] has never extended the scope of liability to a 
corporation,”266 is incorrect. 
B.  Further Examples of Corporate Liability in International Law Missed 
by Kiobel 
Violations of international norms by corporate actors can result in a 
foundation for liability under international law.  For example, the ICJ 
held that if the United States had effective control of Nicaraguan Contras 
and their military operations, it could be vicariously liable for their 
violations.267  Harold Koh points out several more violations of 
international law for which corporations may incur liability: 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Tripartite 
Declaration, for example, obliges corporations not to interfere 
with employees’ rights to form unions and not to use child or 
slave labor.  Nuclear treaties, such as the Paris Convention, 
and oil spill treaties hold shipowners and operators of nuclear 
facilities liable for damage or loss of life to persons and 
property from private nuclear accidents or oil spills.  
Hazardous waste conventions, such as those concluded at 
Basel, impose strict liability on corporate generators of 
hazardous waste.  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
effectively holds corporations liable for bribery.268 
The majority addresses a few of these treaties, but discounts them 
because they impose liability only in their specific fields.269  But set in a 
broader context, such as Koh provides, one can see these treaties as part 
of a clear trend in international law toward a greater assignment of 
benefits and obligations for transnational corporations.  Indeed, the 
majority’s adherence to the view of law expressed by Justice Holmes 
“confuses the existence of responsibility with the mode of implementing 
it.”270  Steven Ratner goes on to argue that this “rich doctrine” leads to 
the conclusion that “decision makers [ought to be able to] transpose the 
primary rules of international human rights law and the secondary rules 
of state and individual responsibility onto corporations.” 
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Kiobel should be decided with a view to its context: an increasingly 
globalized world in which transnational corporations have (in many 
cases) assumed more raw power than many sovereign States.  “If 
corporations are such significant actors in international relations and law, 
then can they not assume the obligations currently placed on States or 
individuals, based on those sets of rules of responsibility?271  Businesses 
have a customary duty of care, especially when operating in areas 
governed unscrupulously.  Even if corporate entities are not yet liable for 
the specific tort alleged in Kiobel, there is certainly no absence of 
corporate liability in international law. 
One of the most notable developers of this area of law, John 
Ruggie, an advisor to the UN secretary-general,272 has proposed a three-
pillar framework for corporate human rights responsibility.273  Under this 
framework, States have an obligation to protect their citizens against 
human rights abuses, corporations and NGOs have a responsibility to 
respect human rights, and victims must have access to effective judicial 
or nonjudicial remedies.274  Ruggie recently published a draft of guiding 
principles275 that, while currently constituting “soft law,” may in time 
become customary and obligatory upon transnational corporations 
everywhere.  “Ruggie’s approach is appealing precisely because it 
departs from the hierarchical rigidity embedded in demarcating 
“subjects” and “objects” of international law.  Ruggie’s delineation of 
corporate responsibility is bottom-up, not top-down.”276 More and more, 
we see corporations talking about “social responsibility” in addition to 
their traditional responsibility to earn profits for shareholders.277 
All the foregoing indicates that even if international law covers the 
“gap” in the Alien Tort Statute, it may not be long before the Kiobel 
majority could indeed point to an international custom that establishes a 
principle of universal justice to regulate transnational entities. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Kiobel majority misinterpreted the Alien Tort Statute.  An ATS 
claim need not “arise under” international law or federal law.  By the 
terms of the statute, an action may be heard when an alien plaintiff 
claims an injury caused by a jus cogens violation and committed by a 
defendant who is subject to personal jurisdiction in a U.S. court.  Some 
jus cogens violations require State action as an element of the offense.  
But other egregious behavior, such as piracy or human trafficking, is 
universally prohibited—this behavior will violate the law of nations 
whether the actor is public, private, or corporate. 
In 1991, Congress reauthorized the ATS, giving the 200-year-old 
statute a new purpose: upholding international human rights law. The 
modern Congress intended the ATS to provide a unique and powerful 
means of vindicating human rights abuses that occurred overseas.  
Congress understood that the application of the ATS to this purpose 
might cause some friction in U.S. foreign relations but believed that such 
tension was “a small price to pay” for justice of this magnitude.  The 
boundaries for possible ATS defendants are defined by the reach of 
federal personal jurisdiction.  Furthermore, since corporations can be 
ATS plaintiffs, they cannot effectively argue that they should be barred 
from being ATS defendants. 
Neither the ATS, Sosa, nor any other federal law “requires” that 
international law extend liability to a corporate entity before the ATS 
will do so.  The boundaries for possible ATS defendants are defined by 
the reach of federal personal jurisdiction.  Furthermore, since 
corporations can be ATS plaintiffs, they cannot effectively argue that 
they should be barred from being ATS defendants. 
“Corporate liability” is not a norm that needs to be found.  The 
requirement for a “violation” relates to conduct prohibited by jus cogens.  
Thus, the ATS comprehends some actions that could never arise in an 
international tribunal.  The ATS does not incorporate, as the majority 
claims, the personal jurisdiction of international tribunals into the 
subject-matter jurisdiction requirements of the ATS.  What’s more, the 
majority’s result, as a matter of policy, allows potential tortfeasors to 
escape liability simply because the wrongs were committed under the 
auspices of a transnational corporation.  It would be preferable for 
potential tortfeasors to escape liability because a trier of fact finds that 
they were not responsible for the alleged torts. 
Even if the majority is correct in assuming that the silence of the 
ATS regarding defendants indicates a gap to be filled by international 
law principles, the majority was wrong to conclude that international law 
has never extended liability to a corporation.  Civil actions against I.G. 
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Farben establish a precedent for ATS litigation.  Farben’s dissolution—a 
corporate death penalty—by the Allies cannot not be understood as 
“spoils of war” or explained away by any other legal theory.  The 
dissolution of Farben was punitive justice for crimes against humanity 
attributed to the corporate body as a whole. 
Finally, even if the majority is correct that these precedents do not 
establish a universally recognized custom subjecting transnational 
corporations to human rights principles today, John Ruggie and others 
are hard at work building international regimes that will bind them.  As 
Judge Edwards predicted, the clear “trend in international law is toward a 
more expansive allocation of rights and obligations to entities other than 
states.”278  What’s more, other courts may fill the void created by the 
Kiobel majority.  “Even if America drops the baton, another country may 
well pick it up.”279 
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